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Freedom of movement is considered a basic human right by the majority of countries of the world.
As defined in practice, it encompasses the right to move internally within a country, the right to move
abroad, and the right to return from abroad.  It does not include the right of an individual from one
sovereign nation to move to another.  In this paper, I examine whether there is an economic rationale
for restricting the rights of individuals to move across borders.  The typical individual who migrates
from a poor developing country to the United States sees an increase in income by a factor of four,
largely as a result of the immense international differences in labor productivity that exist in the world
today.  As an illustrative example, I estimate that migration from Mexico to the United States raises
global income by an amount equivalent to roughly one percent of US GDP.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
As recently as 1970, restrictions on immigration were not considered a major 
policy issue.  The share of the US population that was foreign born, which had been 
declining for five decades, was at five percent, the lowest level ever recorded in a 
US  decennial census  (Borjas, 1999).  In the developed world, the  largest source 
country for immigrants was another  developed  country,  the  United Kingdom.  
Former colonial powers Portugal and Spain were net exporters  of people to  their 
former colonies (Hatton and Williamson, 2002).  In the developing world, the focus 
was more on internal migration from rural to urban areas than on opportunities to 
live and work abroad.  Perhaps the source of greatest contention regarding 
international  labor flows was  restrictions on emigration  in Soviet bloc countries.  
Apparently,  when it came to mobility the world was  more concerned about 
impediments to exit than with barriers to entry. 
That the United States decried Soviet limits on mobility was not incidental.  
Freedom of movement has long been recognized as a basic human right.  In 1215, 
the Magna Carta provided that, 
It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, 
safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time 
of war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners 
and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation at war 




In 1823, the United States Supreme Court recognized freedom of movement as a 
constitutional right.
2
                                                           
1 See 
  Many other countries have since enshrined freedom to travel 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/magnacarta.html.  
2 The US Constitution states, "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States."  In the court’s decision on the 1823 case, Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Bushrod   2 
internally and externally in their constitutions.  In 1948, the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights  contained two entries on mobility, one on  internal 
movement and one on  movement abroad:  “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each State,” and, “Everyone has the right to leave 
any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”
3
  In the last several decades, the world’s interest in international migration has shifted from 
outflows to inflows.  The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the number of countries that 
restrict outward mobility (Gungwu, 1996).  In the developing world, economic factors have lead 
to a sharp increase in the volume of people seeking to emigrate.  Several decades of sluggish 
economic growth in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia have generated weak growth in 
these regions’ demand for labor (Edwards, 2008).  At the same time, national labor supplies have 
expanded rapidly.  Continuing high rates of population growth in Africa and South Asia have 
produced  successively larger generations of young people entering the labor force  (Birdsall, 
Kelley, and Sinding, 2001).  In Latin America, while fertility rates have fallen since the late 1970s, 
these declines came off of previous highs, meaning that in most countries the size of cohorts 
coming of working age continued to grow until quite recently (Hanson and McIntosh, 2009).  
Growth in the size of entering labor force cohorts  remains positive in the Andes,  Central 
America and parts of the Caribbean.  Overall, sluggish labor demand coupled with expanding 
  Notably, these statements do not 
address the issue of entry by foreign citizens into a sovereign nation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Washington wrote, “The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of 
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise… may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and 
immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be 
fundamental.” See http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_3_commerces15.html. 
3 See http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml.   3 
labor supply has increased the number of individuals from poor countries seeking to live and 
work in rich countries. 
  In the developed world, immigration has become a source of intense public debate. 
Recent national elections in Australia, France, and the United States each featured candidates 
(Pauline Hanson; Jean Marie Le Pen; and Duncan Hunter and Tom Tancredo, respectively) 
promising tighter restrictions on labor inflows.  Concerns about immigration stem in part from its 
rise.  In 2006, the foreign born share of the population was 12.9% in Germany, 10.6% in the 
Netherlands, 11.9% in Spain, 10.1% in the United Kingdom and 13.0% in the United States, in 
each case up from single digits in the 1990s.
4
While migrant sending countries frequently criticize Europe and the United States for 
their treatment of immigrants,
  Another source of concern relates to the rise of 
illegality  in  immigrant inflows.  In the United States, roughly one third of the immigrant 
population lacks permission to be in the country (Passel, 2006).  Europe also has high levels of 
undocumented entry, though periodic amnesties in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have kept 
the illegal share of the foreign born population low relative to the United States (Jandl, 2003). 
5
Should freedom of movement be expanded to include to the right of  immigration?  
Allowing greater international labor mobility would be a major shock to the global system.  It 
 and undocumented immigrants in particular, few question their 
right to restrict entry at national borders.  Freedom of movement is seen as applying to internal 
migration and emigration, but not immigration.  The United Nations, in its forthcoming Human 
Development Report (UNDP, 2009), recommends that countries treat immigrants humanely and 
seek to eliminate human trafficking and discrimination against immigrants.  But it does not 
endorse the right of individuals to reside in the country of their choice. 
                                                           
4 See http://www.oecd.org/statsportal.   4 
would shift large numbers of individuals from poor to rich countries, affecting nearly every facet 
of cultural, economic, and political life.  Apart from the practical complications involved in 
enacting such a transformation, is our concept of freedom complete if it permits countries to 
maintain barriers to the entry of foreign citizens? 
In this paper, I examine whether there is an economic rationale for restricting 
the rights of individuals to move across borders.  A utilitarian perspective would 
imply that freer labor mobility would be justified if it makes the world better off as 
a whole.  One challenge in applying this principal is measuring global welfare.  The 
simplest approach would be to equate global welfare to global income, effectively 
giving each wage or salary earning individual an  equal weight in the calculation.  
There are clear deficiencies in such as approach, as it ignores the effect of labor 
mobility  on  non income-earning individuals, including the children and non-
working spouses of migrants.  But the impact of international migration on global 
income provides a weak test of its merits.  If freer mobility lowered global income, 
it would be hard to argue for its adoption. 
Available evidence, crude as it is, suggest the income gains to freer international 
migration  would  be enormous.  In section 2, I summarize recent empirical research,  which 
indicates that the typical individual who migrates from a developing country to the United States 
sees his or her annual labor market earnings rise by a factor of four, even after controlling for 
international differences in the cost of living.  To the extent that wages reflect labor productivity, 
large cross-national differences in wages are evidence of vast international disparities in the 
productive potential of individuals.  Allowing migration from poor to rich countries would move 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 See, e.g., Peter Hakim, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?” Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2006.   5 
labor from where it is less productive to where it is more productive, yielding an increase in 
global income.  Allowing individuals to vote with their feet could yield other economic benefits, 
as national governments came under greater pressure to meet the demands of their populations, 
lest they migrate abroad. 
If we accept the evidence that freer international labor mobility would increase global 
productive potential, justifying restrictions on labor mobility requires replacing global income 
with some other metric to evaluate the consequence of international migration.  In section 3, I 
use economic theory to evaluate the sources of global changes in welfare associated with labor 
mobility.  In theory, moving labor from a poor to rich country raises incomes for the migrants, 
raises (lowers) incomes for individuals who hire labor in the receiving (sending) country, and 
lowers (raises) incomes for laborers in the receiving (sending) country.  One reason why global 
income may not capture the true welfare effects of international migration is that it ignores the 
distributional consequences of labor mobility.  Migration from, say, Mexico to the United States 
is likely to raise incomes for US employers but lower incomes for low skilled US workers.  
While empirical research has not reached a consensus on the wage impacts of immigration, 
available estimates provide a basis for asking how much we would have to value the welfare loss 
to US workers over the welfare gains to potential Mexican immigrants in order to justify US 
immigration restrictions.  Impeding immigration would only make sense if we value the income 
losses of those hurt by migration (workers in the United States, capitalists in Mexico) vastly 
more than the income gains of those helped by migration (migrants from Mexico, workers in 
Mexico, capitalists in the United States). 
Another reason why changes in global income may not be the right way to evaluate the 
welfare effects of migration is that there are negative consequences from labor mobility, which   6 
are not captured by conventional projections of income.  These include the impact of 
immigration on the net tax burden of residents in receiving countries and on the cultural fabric of 
society, which some observers say are affected by the increased ethnic or racial heterogeneity 
that immigration engenders.  Available  evidence  for the United States (the world’s largest 
migrant receiving country) suggests that neither impact is large in quantitative terms, though 
changes in public policy could change the sign and size of the effects. 
By way of conclusion, I observe that available research provides little basis for justifying 
restrictions on international migration on economic grounds.  The effects of immigration on 
receiving countries, whether positive or negative, appear to be small, while the gains to migrants 
are large.  Herein lies the problem in converting analysis of the freedom of movement into 
policy.  The primary beneficiaries from international migration are the migrants themselves and 
their family members (at least when measuring gains in terms of income).  These individuals 
lack a political voice in the governance of global labor flows.  They do not vote in the receiving 
country, at least until well after they have gained entry, and their departure from the sending 
country weakens their political influence there.  The maintenance of barriers to the cross border 
movement of people in part reflects the preference of policy makers in developed countries to 
save particular groups of their citizens from small potential losses at the expense of nullifying the 
very large gains that would accrue to prospective migrants and their families. 
 
2 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
In this section, I examine empirical research on how international migration affects the 
incomes of individuals in sending and receiving countries.  First, I consider the gain in income to 
migrants and evidence on whether  migrants share these gains with family members in the   7 
country or origin.  Second, I consider the impact of global labor flows on the earnings and tax 
burdens of individuals in sending and receiving countries. 
 
2.1 Consequences for Migrants and their Families 
How do we measure the gains to international migration?  Perhaps the simplest approach 
would be to compare per capita GDP in sending and receiving countries.  I use Mexico and the 
United States as an illustrative  example.  In 2000, per capita GDP in Mexico was $9,700, 
compared with $34,500 in the United States,  where all figures are in 2000 US dollars and 
adjusted for purchasing power parity, as reported in Table 1.  The apparent income gain to 
moving from Mexico to the United States is on the order of $25,000. 
 
Table 1: Gain in annual income from migrating from Mexico to the US 
 
Income measure  Source  Value 




US-Mexico difference in average annual 
earnings of 28 to 32 year old males with 9-
11 years of education 
Hanson (2006)  $10,600 
Estimated gain in annual earnings from US 
migration for a 35 year-old urban Mexican 





Average gain in income for a legal immigrant 
from Mexico with 9-12 years of education 
Rosenzweig (2007)  $15,900 
 
All figures are in 2000 US dollars and adjusted for PPP.  Source:  Hanson (2009).  
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One problem with using per capita GDP to measure average income is that it ignores 
cross country differences in education and labor market experience.  Compared to the average 
Mexican worker, the average US worker has more schooling and is older, meaning that all else 
equal the US worker is likely to  have higher earnings.  To refine our measure of income 
differences, we want to compare incomes for individuals with similar observable characteristics.  
Using data from US and Mexico population censuses, Hanson (2006) reports that in 2000 the 
average hourly wage for a 28 to 32 year old male with 9 to 11 years of education (slightly above 
average educational attainment in Mexico) was $2.40 in Mexico and $8.70 for recent Mexican 
immigrants in the US.  At a labor supply of 35 hours per week and 48 weeks per year (the 
average for comparable adult males in the US) this would amount to an annual income gain of 
$10,600, a still substantial gain but one that is fair smaller than the difference in per capita GDP. 
Clemons, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) carry the analysis a step further.  Combining 
household survey data in developing countries with data from the US Census, they estimate that 
in 2000 the annual income gain to migration for a 35 year-old urban male from Mexico with 9 to 
12 years of education was $9,200.  This comparison, as in Hanson (2006), evaluates income to 
migrants against incomes to non-migrants.  Even when conditioning on age and education, the 
two groups may have differences in unobservable skills, related to motivation, cognitive ability, 
motor skills, or quality of education, that affect their earnings.  We know from abundant 
empirical evidence that migrants tend to be positively selected in terms of education (Hanson, 
2007), in that in most countries more educated individuals are more likely to emigrate than less 
educated individuals.  If positive selection also applies to unobserved  skills,  measured 
differences in income between migrants and non-migrants may overstate the gains to migration.  
The higher earnings of Mexican migrants in the United States would in part reflect higher wages   9 
north of the border and in part migrants’ higher levels of unobserved skill.   
Using a range of econometric techniques, Clemons, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) 
attempt to control for self-selection on unobservables in migration.  They find that observed 
gains to migration overstate true gains by 1.25 to 1.5 times.  For the Mexico-US case, the gain to 
migration would fall from $10,000 to $6,700 to $8,000, which is still large (on the order of two 
times average income for a family in rural Mexico (Hanson, 2006)).  Across a sample of 42 
developing countries, Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett estimate the median annual gain from 
migrating to the United States for a young adult male to be $11,200.   
An alternative comparison is to examine income for the same individual, before and after 
migration.  Rosenzweig (2007) uses data from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) to examine the 
change in income for a random sample of new US permanent legal immigrants in 2003.  The 
advantage of this approach is that the NIS contains earnings for migrants in their last job in their 
country of origin and in their current job in the United States, allowing Rosenzweig to control for 
unobserved components of skill that do not change over time.  The disadvantage is that the 
sample consists only of permanent legal immigrants (those who succeed in obtaining a green 
card), which misses about one third of the US immigrant population.  For a legal immigrant from 
Mexico with 9 to 12 years of education, the average gain in income is $15,900.  These gains are 
larger than for the Hanson and Clemons et al. samples of migrants and non-migrants, which 
include illegal immigrants among the migrant population (given that many illegal immigrants are 
enumerated in the US census (Hanson, 2006)). 
The income gain from migration captures the gross return from moving to another 
country.  If the cost to migration is large, the net gain could be much smaller.  These costs 
include transport expenses in moving abroad, time lost in changing labor markets, administrative   10 
fees for legal migration, border crossing costs in illegal migration, the psychic costs of leaving 
home, and any perceived increase in uncertainty from living and working in another country.  
There is little work quantifying these costs, leaving our understanding of the net benefits from 
international migration incomplete. 
  Who  else  benefits from the increase in income that migrants enjoy?  Through 
remittances, migrants share a portion of their extra income with family members at home.  In the 
last decade, remittances have increased markedly in East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, though they appear to have fallen during the 
recent global financial crisis.  As of 2007, remittances were 5.7% of GDP in low income 
countries (as classified by the World Bank), with the highest shares by region in the Middle East 
and North Africa (3.7% of GDP), South Asia (3.6% of GDP), Sub-Saharan Africa (2.5% of 
GDP), and Latin America and the Caribbean (1.8% of GDP).  In  Central America  and  the 
Caribbean, remittances account for a large share of national income, ranging from 12% to 22% 
of GDP in Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua.
6
  For later calculations on the global effects of international migration, I will continue to 
use migration from Mexico to the United States as an example.  Using Clemens, Montenegro, 
and Pritchett’s (2008) results, which are based on data from 2000, migration to the United States 
raises annual earnings to Mexican workers by approximately four times, for an increase of 300%.  
The gross gain from Mexican migration to the US (i.e., ignoring the costs of migration) is given 
by the expression, 
 
Change in wages for Mexican migrants * Number of migrants 
which we can rewrite as 
                                                           
6 Figures on remittances are from the World Development Indicators (http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/).   11 
% change in wages for Mexican migrants * Mexico-US wage ratio * 
 




where I scale values by US GDP to make the resulting values easier to interpret.  A back of the 
envelope calculation suggests that in 2000 migration from Mexico to the United States yielded 
gross income gains to migrants on the order of 1.2% of US GDP. 
 
2.2 Consequences of International Migration for Sending and Receiving Countries  
     Empirical research on the consequences of international migration has focused on two 
channels through which global labor flows affect income.  One is through the labor market, as 
the movement of individuals across borders changes the supply of labor in sending and receiving 
countries.  The second is through public finances, as labor inflows or outflows change 
government revenues and government spending.  I consider each channel in turn.  
    There is considerable academic debate about the  labor-market consequences of 
international migration.  Most early research focused on the impact of labor inflows on the US 
wage structure, with the literature recently beginning to examine other receiving countries and 
effects on sending economies.  One line of research, pioneered by George Borjas, uses data on 
the national US labor market to  suggest that immigration depresses wages for US workers.  
Borjas (2003) defines labor markets at the national level according to a worker’s education and 
labor-market experience.  Over the period 1960 to 2000, education-experience cells in which 
immigrant labor supply growth has been larger – in particular, for young high school dropouts – 
have had slower wage growth, even after controlling for shocks to wages that are specific to 
education or experience groups.  The evidence is consistent with immigration having depressed   12 
wages for low-skilled US workers (as well as for some high-skilled workers).  Criticisms of this 
approach (e.g., Card, 2005) argue that it confounds immigration with other labor-market shocks 
that have hurt low-skilled workers, such as skill-biased technological change, deunionization, or 
declines in the real minimum wage.  Absent explicit controls for these other shocks, one cannot 
be sure that the wage changes attributed to immigration are not in fact due to other factors.  
    Interestingly, the Borjas method yields qualitatively similar results in other countries.  
Applying a national-level approach to Canada, Aydemir and Borjas (2008) find comparable 
evidence of the wage effects of migration.  In Canada, where immigration has been dominated 
by workers toward to the top end of the skill distribution, immigration is negatively correlated 
with wages across education-experience cells, with more-educated workers being the ones who 
have suffered the largest wage effects.  Since Canada is presumably subject to many of the same 
technology shocks as the United States, unobserved technology shocks could not explain away 
the wage effects of immigration in both countries.  Results for Canada and the United States, in 
which different types of immigration depress wages for the relevant group of workers, provides 
some external validity for the Borjas approach. 
    Borjas’ method yields qualitatively similar results for the wage effects of migration in 
sending countries, where wages rise as a result of the labor outflow.  Mishra (2007) finds a 
positive correlation between emigration and wages across education-experience cells in Mexico.  
In Mexico, emigrants come disproportionately from the middle of the skill distribution, meaning 
workers with close to average levels of education are those that have had the largest wage gains 
from labor outflows.  Aydemir and Borjas (2008) obtain similar results.  They find that the 
elasticity of wages with respect to labor supply is roughly similar in Canada, Mexico, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 To calculate the last value in the expression, I multiply the share of Mexican immigrants in US labor income, taken   13 
United States.  In all three countries, a 10% change in labor supply due to migration is associated 
with a 4% to 6% change in wages. 
    A second line of research on the wage impacts of immigration, which encompasses an 
older and larger literature, correlates the change in wages for low-skilled US natives with the 
change in the immigrant presence across local labor markets, typically at the level of US cities or 
states.  These so-called area studies tend to find that immigration has little if any impact on US 
wages.  Card (2005) argues that if immigration had affected the US wage structure one should 
see larger declines in the wages of native high school dropouts (relative to other groups) in US 
cities where the relative supply of high school dropouts expanded by more.  In fact, the 
correlation between the relative wage and the relative supply of US high school dropouts across 
US cities is close to zero.  Card takes this as evidence that Borjas’ national-level approach is 
flawed and that the true impact of immigration on wages is close to zero. 
    The area study approach has also been subject to criticism.  One concern is reverse 
causality.  Immigrants may settle in US cities where job growth is strong.  In this event, one 
would not find a negative correlation between immigration and wages because immigrants select 
cities that have booming labor demand.  As a correction, many studies have attempted to predict 
the exogenous portion of growth in local immigrant labor supply by using historical immigrant 
settlement patterns.  However, this strategy is only valid if the shocks that drive growth in local 
labor demand are not very persistent over time (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997). 
    Most research on other receiving countries reports  small  impacts of immigration on 
wages.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a large migration of Russian Jews to 
Israel, increasing the Israeli population by 12% in less than five years.  Friedberg (2001) finds 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from the 2000 US census, which is 0.022, by the labor share of US national income, taken to be 0.70.   14 
that Israeli occupations with more immigrants did have slower wage growth, but her result is not 
robust to controlling for immigrants’ occupational choice.  Hanson (2009) reviews  other 
applications of the area studies approach outside of the United States. 
    We are left with conflicting evidence on the labor market impact of immigration.  For our 
later discussion, the only justification for restricting immigration inflows would be if it lowered 
wages for vulnerable groups substantially.  For our purposes, it makes sense to use estimates of 
the wage impacts of immigration that are on the larger end, as this presents the strongest possible 
case against freeing immigration.  I will use Borjas’ (2003) estimates that a 10% increase in the 
labor supply associated with immigration lowers wages by 4%, such that the elasticity of wages 
with respect to immigration is 0.4. 
    Following the analysis in Borjas (1999), migration from Mexico to the United States 
would raise incomes for employers and lower incomes for US workers, where the former 
exceeds the later, yielding an immigration surplus for the US economy (ignoring the fiscal 
consequences, which I discuss next).  The immigration surplus is the result of the increased 
productivity of capital and other factors resulting from an increase in the supply of labor to the 
economy.  For employers, the income gain is the savings from lower wages to native workers 
plus the immigration surplus, which we can write as 
[Change in wage * Native labor force] + [0.5 * Change in wage * Immigrant inflow]. 
Scaling by US GDP, this sum can be rewritten as 
[Wage elasticity * (Immigrant earnings/ GDP)] + 
[0.5 * % change in labor force from immigration * Wage elasticity * (Immigrant earnings/GDP)] 
 = [0.4 * 0.016] + [0.5 * 0.04* 0.4 * 0.016] = 0.64% + 0.01% = 0.65%, 
 
where in the third line I use the  Borjas and Katz (2007) estimate that in 2000 Mexican 
immigrants were four percent of the US labor force.  This back of the envelope calculation   15 
suggests US employers enjoy income gains from Mexican immigration on the order of 0.65% of 
US GDP, while US workers experiences losses from Mexican immigration on the order of 0.64% 
of US GDP, with the net income gain (the surplus to the US economy from immigration from 
Mexico) on the order of 0.01% of US GDP.  Immigration has much larger effects on the 
distribution of US income (shifting income from workers to employers) than on the total level of 
US income. 
The labor market is by no means the only area where the effects of international 
migration are felt.  Labor flows also have important consequences for a country’s fiscal accounts.  
The exodus of labor deprives  sending countries of taxpayers,  while  reducing  demands on 
education, health care, and other public services.  The arrival of labor in sending countries has 
the reverse effects, increasing the number of taxpayers while increasing demands on public 
services.  Whether labor flows increase or decrease the net fiscal burden on resident taxpayers in 
the sending country depends on the skill level of the migrants, the volume of migration, and the 
tax and welfare policies of the countries involved. 
With regards to sending countries, there is a large body of theoretical literature on the 
taxation of skilled emigration (e.g., Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989),  but much less empirical 
research.  In one of the few studies available, Desai, Kapur, and McHale (2008) examine the 
fiscal effects of brain drain on India.  In 2000, individuals with tertiary education (13 or more 
years of schooling) accounted for 61% of Indian emigrants but just 5% of India’s population.  
Also in 2000, the emigration rate for the tertiary educated in India was 4.3% (though only 0.4% 
for the population as a whole), up from 2.8% in 1990.  Desai, Kapur, and McHale examine 
Indian emigration to the US, which in 2000 was host to 65% of India’s skilled emigrants.  They 
use wage regressions to produce income levels that emigrants would have earned had they stayed   16 
in India, based on their age and education.  They run the projected wage series through the 
Indian tax code to estimate the tax revenues that India has lost due to skilled emigration.  They 
also calculate lost sales tax revenues and other indirect tax payments.  On the spending side, they 
calculate how much India saved by not having to provide government services to the emigrating 
population.  Their results suggest Indian emigration to the United States cost India net tax 
contributions (taxes less expenditure) of 0.24% of GDP in 2000, hardly a monumental sum.  
Desai, Kapur, and McHale estimate further that remittances by skilled emigrants generated a tax 
gain of 0.1% of GDP, which partially offsets the net tax loss.  For India, the tax consequences of 
skilled emigration appear to be small.  Naturally, countries with skilled emigration rates higher 
than India’s 4% level could face larger impacts. 
In receiving countries, immigration may worsen  inefficiencies associated with a 
country’s system of public finance.  Where immigrants pay more in taxes than they receive in 
government benefits, immigration reduces the net tax burden on native taxpayers. In contexts 
where immigrants pay less in taxes than they receive in government benefits, immigration 
increases the net tax burden on natives, necessitating an increase in current taxes on natives, a 
reduction in current government benefits to natives, or increased borrowing from future 
generations.  The major high-income receiving countries (Australia, Canada, the United States, 
and the countries of Western Europe) have progressive income taxes and means-tested 
entitlement programs.  With such a structure, positive fiscal consequences from immigration 
would appear to be more likely the more skilled is the labor inflow.     
How large are the net fiscal consequences of immigration in actuality?  Unfortunately, 
there are few studies that address the issue.  One of the few comprehensive national level 
analyses of the fiscal impact of immigration was by the National Research Council (NRC),   17 
which conducted a study of the United States (Smith and Edmonston, 1997).  In 2000, the share 
of the foreign-born in the US adult population was 15%.  The NRC estimated that in 1996 
immigration imposed a short-run fiscal burden on the average US native household of $200, or 
0.2% of U.S. GDP.  What about illegal immigrants?  Camarota (2004) applies the NRC 
methodology to estimate the fiscal impact of illegal immigration in the United States. He finds 
that in 2002 US illegal immigrants on net received $10 billion more in government benefits than 
they paid in taxes, a value equal to 0.1% of US GDP in that year. 
These figures are small.  That the fiscal effects of immigration are negative reflect the 
fact immigrant households tend to be larger, younger, and run by individuals with relatively low 
education and earnings.  Their tax contributions are relatively low, while their demands on public 
services (and public education and health care in particular) are relatively large.  To return to the 
Mexico-United States example, if we assume that the net  fiscal costs from immigration are 
proportional to the size of the immigrant population, then given that in 2000 immigrants from 
Mexico accounted for 30% of the total US foreign born population, the fiscal costs associated 
with immigration from Mexico in 2000 would be on the order of 0.06% of US GDP.   
One important caveat to the NRC analysis is that going from a short-run to a long-run 
estimate of the fiscal cost of immigration can change the results considerably.  Many immigrants 
are young and far from their peak earning and taxpaying years.  As immigrants age, their net 
fiscal contribution increases.  Also, their children are likely to be more educated and to make 
greater tax contributions.  The NRC estimates that the average immigrant admitted in 1990 
would produce a net fiscal contribution of $80,000 over the next 300 years (in present discounted 
value terms), with the contribution depending on the individual’s skill level. The long-run fiscal 
contribution is negative for low-skilled immigrants (less than a high-school education) and   18 
positive for higher-skilled immigrants (more than a high-school education).  Going 300 years 
forward requires strong assumptions about the future economy. Even for the average immigrant, 
the annual net fiscal contribution is negative for the first twenty-five years after arriving in the 
United States. The long-run estimate assumes the federal government will ultimately raise taxes 
to bring the federal budget into balance.  If this doesn’t happen, and the government lowers 
benefits instead, the long-run fiscal contribution of the average immigrant would be negative.   
     
  In theory, international migration raises global income, while it redistributes 
income within countries.  Using empirical results from the literature that would 
make the consequences of Mexico to United States migration are large as possible, 
in 2000 losses to US workers would be about 0.64% of US GDP, gains to US 
employers would be about 0.65% of US GDP (offset by fiscal costs of 0.06% of 
GDP, if we treat employers as the primary tax payers), and gains to migrants would 
be about 1.21% of US GDP  (plus the 0.06% fiscal transfer they receive from US 
taxpayers).  There is loss in Mexican GDP associated with the labor outflow (losses 
to Mexican employers net of the gains to Mexican workers), which Mishra (2007) 
estimates  in 2000 to be on the order of 0.03% of US GDP.
8  In total, Mexican 
migration to the US appears to raise global income by an amount roughly equivalent 
to (1.21% + 0.06%) + (0.65% - 0.06%) – 0.64% - 0.03% = 1.19% of US GDP.   
The gain in global income would be smaller if the fiscal consequences are 
larger than I have assumed or if the US wage effects from immigration are smaller.  
My calculation is based on a very simply model and imposes a large number of   19 
untested assumptions.  It should not be treated as sufficiently precise for policy 
purposes.  Yet, it highlights the fact that the gains to migrants from international 
mobility appear large relative to the net effects on receiving or sending country 
economies.  Of course, these  gains are gross and may  be smaller once migration 
costs are taken into account. 
 
3 EVALUATING WELFARE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
Equating  global welfare with global income, it appears that migration from 
Mexico to the United States is welfare improving.  While US workers lose, gains to 
US employers offset these losses, at least when following the logic of the model in 
Borjas (1999).  And while US taxpayers suffer an increase in their net tax burden, 
Mexican immigrants enjoy an offsetting positive net fiscal transfer.  The primary 
net  impact  of migration on global income is  the gains to migrants.  Scaling up 
migration would simply scale up these effects, assuming that there are no 
significant externalities associated with international labor flows.
9 
To argue that international migration is not welfare improving,  one would 
have to reject the weighting scheme that is implicit in equating changes in global 
income with changes in global welfare.  The implicit scheme gives each individual 
a uniform weight, such that a dollar income loss to a US worker is valued the same 
as a dollar income gain to a US employer or a Mexican migrant.  To justify 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 Mishra’s (2007) results suggest that in 2000 the emigration loss in Mexico was 0.5% of Mexican GDP.  I convert 
this into US GDP equivalents using the fact that in 2000 Mexican GDP was six percent of US GDP. 
9 A larger scale to migration may have other significant effects on global income.  In assuming that the net fiscal 
loss to US taxpayers is offset by a net fiscal gain to Mexican migrants, I ignore the deadweight loss associated with 
taxation.  If larger immigrant inflows increase the net fiscal loss to native taxpayers substantially it may produce a 
significant deadweight loss in the form of weakened incentives to earn income.   20 
restrictions on immigration, we would have to weight the welfare of US workers 
more heavily than either US employers or Mexican migrants.   
One reason why one may one to weight income changes for US workers more 
heavily than US employers is that workers tend to be poorer than employers.   
Economic theory suggests that the gain in welfare an individual enjoys from a 
dollar increase in income declines as the individual’s income level increases.  We 
thus  expect that the marginal utility of income for US workers exceeds the 
marginal utility of income for US employers.  If we wish society to allocate rights 
to individuals or enact policy interventions in a manner that maximizes  social 
welfare, greater weight should be put on how these decisions affect the welfare of 
workers than on how they affect the welfare of employers.  Taking the marginal 
utility of income into account does not indicate that governments seek attempt to 
equalize  income across individuals but it does imply that in thinking about 
incremental changes to  the organization of society we may want to be more 
sensitive to the effects on the poor than on the rich.  
While recognizing that  variation in the marginal utility of income across 
individuals leads  one to weight US workers more heavily than US employers,  it 
also leads one to weight Mexican migrants more heavily than US workers.  In 
considering the migration rights that maximize global welfare, one could not argue 
that US workers be weighted more heavily than both richer employers and poorer 
migrants.  If fact, following a principal of weighting income changes (caused by 
international migration)  by the marginal utility of income for each individual 
generally  leads  one to weight the income of migrants more heavily than in a   21 
straight income calculation of welfare changes.  Such a weighting scheme further 
strengthens the logic behind expanding migration rights. 
Weighting income changes caused by migration either uniformly or by the 
marginal utility of income leads to the conclusion that the freer international 
mobility of labor raises world welfare.  Expanding the concept of the freedom of 
movement to include the right of individuals to move from one sovereign nation to 
another has a sound economic rationale.  What extenuating factors might affect this 
conclusion? 
One concern raised about immigration is that it weakens the social fabric of 
receiving countries, an argument made forcefully about  the United States by 
Huntington (2004).  However, there is weak empirical support for the Huntington 
hypothesis.  Considering immigrants from Mexico, they have higher employment 
rates, lower rates of incarceration, higher marriage  rates, and higher rates of 
church attendance than  US natives with comparable income or education levels.  
Rather than weakening the US social fabric, immigration from Mexico would seem 
to reinforce the values of hard work, dedication to family, and religious 
participation that Huntington celebrates. 
Another concern about international migration is that it weakens prospects 
for economic development in sending countries.  Because emigrants tend to 
positively selected in terms of skill, an outflow of labor removes scarce human 
capital from poor countries, possibly reducing prospects for economic growth.   
Countering the effects of brain drain, however, are increased incentives to acquire 
skill within sending countries, which may partially or fully replace the human   22 
capital lost to migration (Docquier and Rapoport, 2008).  While empirical research 
on brain drain versus brain gain is inconclusive (Hanson, 2009), there does not 
appear to be strong evidence that emigration undermines development. 
 
4 DISCUSSION 
  Freedom of movement is considered a basic human right by the large 
majority of democratic countries of the world.  As defined in practice, it 
encompasses the right to move internally within a country, the right to move 
abroad, and the right to return from abroad.  It does not include the right of an 
individual from one sovereign nation to move to another.  Restrictions on 
international mobility have enormous consequences for global welfare.  The typical 
individual who migrates from a poor developing to the United States sees an 
increase in income by a factor of four, after controlling for cost of living 
differences.  Applying results from the economics literature, I perform a series of 
calculations that suggest migration from Mexico to the United States, which is the 
largest flow of international migrants in the world today, raises global income by 
an amount equivalent to roughly one percent of US GDP.  Using conventional 
welfare measures, it appears to raise global welfare, as well. 
  Yet, the United States, together with all other high income countries, 
maintains tight restrictions on labor inflows from abroad.  These restrictions may 
benefit US workers and taxpayers who are hurt by migration, but come at the 
expense of lost income for US employers and, more significantly, for prospective 
migrants denied the opportunity to move abroad.  Given the US government is   23 
beholden to US voters and not to potential migrants, it comes as little surprise that 
it chooses not to realize these income gains.  The  costs of this policy  choice  in 
terms of global welfare appear to be large.     24 
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